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ABSTRACT  
 
The forcible protection of one states‟ own nationals on another state‟s 
territory is one which stretches the boundaries of the broader, inherent right of 
self-defence available to states under international law. Known as the 
„protection of nationals abroad‟ this doctrine is one which remains, at best, 
highly controversial. This Article examines the lawfulness of action taken by 
British forces when they rescued and evacuated British nationals prior to 
Libya descending into civil war. It also considers the extent to which action 
by British forces fits within the highly controversial paradigm of „protection 
of nationals abroad‟.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The middle of February 2011 witnessed the descent into civil war of the 
Great Socialist People‟s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. For the United Kingdom 
and other states arose the pressing question of how to provide for the 
protection and safety of their nationals based in Libya. At that time the UK 
government (along with other governments) made the decision that the 
appropriate response to the developing and increasingly violent conflict in 
Libya was to take steps to evacuate their nationals from harm‟s way. At the 
end of that month, British military Special Forces troops entered Libya and 
effected an operation to evacuate British nationals (and other nationals, as it 
turned out) from Libya. Apparently, for good operational reasons, the action 
by British Special Forces was planned and executed in secret and presumably 
without the consent of the Libyan government.
1
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It is notable that little comment was made in the British media (or other 
international media outlets) with respect to the lawfulness of the intervention 
of British troops within a sovereign state for the purpose of evacuating its 
nationals without that state‟s consent. Moreover, in its explanation of the 
operation to evacuate its nationals the British government made no apparent 
consideration of the status of its actions within international law. This lack of 
comment could give the impression that such conduct – the intervention by 
one state in another state to effect the evacuation of its nationals without the 
host state‟s consent, the concept of „protection of nationals abroad‟ – is 
acceptable in international law to the point of being uncontroversial. 
However, the question of the lawfulness or otherwise of the concept of the 
protection of national abroad is not uncontroversial and is not settled as lawful 
in international law.  
The possibility in international law of a state utilising force to protect its 
own nationals in another state („the protection of nationals abroad‟) is 
something which has been carefully scrutinised by commentators.
2
 The main 
debate within both the literature and the actual practice of individual states 
(„state practice‟) is whether such action is permissible under international law 
and, if so, on what basis.
3
  
Broadly speaking, two perspectives on this issue predominate. On the one 
hand, there are those that argue that the right to protect one‟s nationals abroad 
is a species of unilateral humanitarian intervention whereas, on the other, 
there are those who argue that the right to protect nationals abroad is more 
properly a legitimate exercise of a states inherent right to self-defence. This 
                                                                                                                              
Telegraph (London, February 27, 2011) 1; and S McGee and J Bone “Hundreds are 
Still Stranded in the Desert” The Sunday Times (London, February 27, 2011) 2. 
2
 For example, see D W Bowett  “The Use of Force for The Protection of Nationals 
Abroad” in A Cassese (ed) The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); JA Green  “Passportisation, Peacekeepers and 
Proporationality: The Russian Claim of the Protectionf of Nationals Abroad in Self-
Defence” in James A Green and Christopher P M Waters (eds) Conflict in the 
Caucasus: Implications for International Legal Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), pp 54 – 79; TC Wingfield and JE Meyen Lillich on the Forcible 
Protection of Nationals Abroad : in Memory of Professor Richard B Lillich 
(International Law Studies Series, US Naval War College 2002); KE Eichensehr 
“Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues 
Note” (2007) 48 Va J Int'l L 451; T Ruys “The “Protection of Nationals' Doctrine 
Revisited” (2008) 13 J Conflict Security Law 233; TC Wingfield “Forcible Protection 
of Nationals Abroad” (1999) 104 Dick L Rev 439; and R J Zedalis “Protection of 
Nationals Abroad: Is Consent the Basis of Legal Obligation” (1990) 25 Tex Int'l L J 
209. 
3
 Green provides a useful summary of the positions taken regarding this issue. See 
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Article will confine itself to examining the development of the doctrine of 
protection of nationals abroad as a species/aspect of states inherent right to 
self-defence.
4
 The authors recognise that there are those commentators that 
argue that the protection of nationals abroad is a legitimate aspect of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention.
5
 However, as the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is at best an extremely controversial doctrine in itself, it is the 
authors‟ view that it is not the proper basis for consideration of the 
development of the doctrine of protection of nationals abroad.
6
 Moreover, as 
Green notes “…importantly, it is apparent that when states do make a legal 
claim based on the protection of nationals abroad, they do so within the rubric 
of self-defence.”7 Some commentators in favour of a right to protection of 
nationals abroad argue that the doctrine is merely an extension of the inherent 
right of self-defence available to all states under international law.
8
 States‟ 
support for this doctrine as a manifestation of self-defence is to some extent 
evidenced by state practice.
9
 The criticisms and objections against the practice 
of utilising force to protect nationals are multifaceted,
10
 and this is something 
this Article will carefully scrutinise in Part III.
11
  
The purpose of this Article is to examine whether the action taken by 
British troops in protecting and evacuating British nationals following the 
uprising against the Gaddafi regime in February 2011 was lawful under 
international law. This Article does not assess the lawfulness of action taken 
against the Gaddafi regime following the adoption of Security Council 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973: that is left for other commentators to consider 
elsewhere. The next section, Part II, provides the detail regarding the British 
action.  Part III then examines the extent to which there is a right to protect 
ones nationals abroad within the broader concept of self-defence under 
international law.  Finally, Part IV goes on to apply this legal framework to 
the February 2011 British intervention.   
                                                     
4
 Ibid, p 59. 
5
 See D J Gordon “Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe 
Incident Note” (1977) 9 Case W Res J Int'l L 117; and N Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals 
Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity 
(Dordrecht Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 
6
 See Green above n 2, p 59. Moreover, Green goes on to note: “[A] conceptual 
distinction should be made between such actions and those aimed at the protection of 
nationals abroad. One claim relates to the protection of a state‟s own nationals, the 
other to the protection of foreign nationals.” 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 T Farer “Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm" (1990) 84 Am J Int'l L 494 at505. 
9
 See infra Part II on this point.   
10
 Green above n 2, pp 59 – 63. 
11
 See infra Part III for a complete discussion of this issue.   
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II. BRITISH ACTION IN LIBYA 
 
The British evacuation of its nationals from Libya during the early 
passage of the Libyan conflict was carried out by members of the British 
military‟s Special Forces; the Secret Air Service and the Secret Boat Service. 
In what was variously described as a „daring‟ and „dramatic‟ raid the two 
arms of the British Special Forces completed their mission in a manner 
befitting their famed motto „who dares wins‟.12 Over the course of the 
weekend of 26
th
 and 27
th
 February 2011 British Special Forces carried out 
operations to rescue and extract British and other nationals from Libya.
13
 It 
was widely reported in the British media that members of the Special Forces 
had first arrived in Tripoli a number of days before the evacuation to prepare 
the ground for their intended mission.
14
 As the situation in Libya deteriorated 
and the threat to British nationals intensified the operation was put into gear.  
Striking out from their base in Tripoli the Special Forces troops travelled 
extensively throughout the Libya gathering up British and other nationals to 
take them to pre-determined airfields under the control of anti-Gaddaffi forces 
and private security professionals under the pay of multinational oil 
companies in the area for air evacuation.
15
 From these extraction points 
British and other nationals were then flown to a British Airforce base in Malta 
on RAF Hercules transport planes specially equipped to support Special 
Forces operations. It was reported that during the final phase of the rescue 
gunfire was exchanged but no casualties were sustained although there was 
inconsequential damage to one of the aircraft from small arms fire. On 
landing in the Malta, the actions and success of the operation was reported by 
the British government and heralded as a complete success.
16
  
In explaining its decision to authorise such an operation the UK identified 
the general situation in Libya as being unstable and violent giving rise to 
particular dangers that warranted it taking action. Clearly, the government was 
under pressure from public opinion and the national media to do something, 
and to be seen to do something, to protect British nationals. However, whilst 
there was a general threat of violence and danger to those living in Libya, 
whether Libyan or foreign nationals, there was no greater apparent threat 
made to British nationals or foreign nationals as had been the case with 
respect to the attempted rescue/evacuation by the US of its nationals from Iran 
                                                     
12
 See above n 1. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 M Evans “The Evacuation” The Daily Telegraph (London, February 28, 2011) 5. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
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in the 1970s or the rescue of its nationals effected by Israeli Special Forces in 
Entebbe, Uganda. Nevertheless, from the British government‟s perspective 
the general instability and the very generalised threat of danger to foreign 
nationals as members of Libyan society was a sufficient justification for 
sending military forces onto the sovereign territory of another state without 
invitation. A lack of such invitation would constitute a prima facie breach of 
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter which prohibits a state intervening 
in another state‟s sovereign affairs. Technically, Article 2(7) only prohibits 
the United Nations from intervening in matters within a state‟s domestic 
jurisdiction.
17
  However, if one couples this prohibition with that contained in 
Article 2(4) along with the customary principle of non-intervention, then a 
state cannot interfere in another state‟s affairs. The only exception to the 
position within Article 2(7) is if the Security Council has sanctioned a state to 
deploy on another state‟s sovereign territory.    
It is notable in both the news/media reporting and government comment 
that no question of the lawfulness or otherwise of such an operation was 
seriously raised. Moreover, in addition to the UK action, other states, 
including China, also undertook similar operations to evacuate nationals. 
Added to this there was little or no objection by the international community 
or Libya, suggesting a toleration of such practice despite doubts surrounding 
the lawfulness of these types of operations.  
 
III. THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD 
 
The concept of „protection of nationals abroad‟ has been defined as the 
use of force by a state to protect its nationals that are under attack, be that 
actual or threatened, outside of its own territory, without the consent of the 
state against which force is used or the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council.
18
As such, any arguable right to protect nationals abroad is based on a 
broad construction of the right of self-defence to which all states are entitled 
to under international law.
19
 This Part examines how such a right could be 
constructed.  It first sets out the basic mechanics of self-defence and how this 
particular doctrine operates under international law. It then goes on to 
consider how a state might construct a right to protect its nationals abroad as 
an extension of self-defence. Finally, this Part will consider the practical 
                                                     
17
 UN Charter art 2, para 7. 
18
 The protection of nationals abroad is not provided for in Charter and there exists no 
independent doctrine of customary international law permitting such actions. See 
Green above note 2, p 58; and A Arend and R Beck International Law and the Use of 
Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1993) p 94.  
19
 Green above n 2, p 59. 
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application of such a right and examine some specific instances when states 
have invoked the existence of such a doctrine.   
It is important to note the „default position‟ that any use of force by one 
state against another is unlawful under the strict prohibition contained in 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
20
 Equally, one must also recall the 
combined effect of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter and the principle of non-intervention which 
prohibits a state interfering within another state‟s domestic affairs.  Prima 
facie, the use of force to protect nationals abroad is in clear breach of the 
combined effect of the provisions set out in the preceding sentence. However, 
international law permits two exceptions to the cardinal rule contained in 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.  First, a state may act in self-
defence against a prior use of military force providing that it complies with 
certain criteria which have developed from customary international law and 
treaty law.
21
 The second exception is if the United Nations Security Council 
under its „Chapter VII powers‟ authorises a state to use force.22  Those in 
favour of the doctrine of protecting nationals abroad argue that such action 
falls within the first exception - under a more elastic interpretation of self-
defence.
23
         
 
Overview of Self-Defence 
 
The right of self-defence under international law has attracted 
considerable academic scrutiny.
24
 In light of that fact, this section will focus 
on setting out the basic conditions required for a state to invoke self-defence 
rather than, for example, revisiting the more contentious issues surrounding 
                                                     
20
 UN Charter art 2, para 4.  
21
 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar v US), 
1986 ICJ 14, ¶ 34 (June 27). 
22
 UN Charter art. 42. 
23
 Green above n 2, p 61. Although not strictly in favour of the doctrine of the 
protection of nationals abroad, Green allows for the conceptual possibility of such a 
doctrine. 
24
 For a useful overview, see J A Green and F Grimal   "The Threat of Force as an 
Action in Self-Defense under International Law" (2011) 44 Vand J Transnat'l L 285 at 
298–302. For more detailed discussion see, for example, JA Green The International 
Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law (Oxford Hart Publishing, 
2009); DW Bowett Self-Defence in International Law (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1958); A Constantinou The Right of Self-Defence Under Customary 
International Law and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Athènes Bruxelles: 
Ant N Sakkoulas; Bruylant, 2000); Y Dinstein War, Aggression and Self-Defence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4th edn, 2005); CD Gray International Law 
and the Use of Force (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2008). 
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both anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence.
25
 The law governing a state‟s 
right to self-defence is a combination of both customary international law and 
Charter law.
26
 Customary principles dictate that a state acting in self-defence 
must do so within the parameters of necessity and proportionality: customary 
law principles that have been distilled from the words of US Secretary of 
State Webster following the well known Caroline incident, according to 
which a state invoking self-defence must: 
 
“[S]how a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to 
show, also, that... [it] did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the 
act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that 
necessity and kept clearly within it.”27  
 
The necessity principle dictates that a state must be left with no other non-
forcible alternatives – force is to be used as a last resort.28  Proportionality 
simply requires the level of force used in self-defence be commensurate to the 
severity of the attack.
29
 Some commentators posit a „restrictive‟ view that the 
cornerstone provision contained in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
overrides previous customary international law.
30
 The vast majority of 
scholars however accept that the inherent customary provisions still exist and 
                                                     
25
 On pre-emption, see generally NA Shah "Self-Defence, Anticipatory Self-Defence 
and Pre-Emption: International Law‟s Response to Terrorism" (2007) 12 Journal of  
Conflict Security Law 95 at 111; and C Antonopoulos "Force by Armed Groups as 
Armed Attack and the Broadening of Self-Defence" (2008) 55 Neth Int‟l L Rev 159. 
26
 See above n 24 generally and in particular J A Green The International Court of 
Justice and Self-Defence in International Law pp 128-138. 
27
 Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry S Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), in 29 British and 
Foreign State Papers (1841–42), 1129–39 (1857). For more detailed discussion see J 
A Green “Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in 
Contemporary Customary International Law concerning Self-Defense” (2006) 14 
Cardozo J Int'l & Comp L 429. 
28
  Green „Docking the Caroline' ibid  at 450-457. 
29
 See for example, J Gardam Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p 142; and R Wedgwood 
“Proportionality and Necessity in American National Security Decision Making 
Implementing Limitations on the Use of Force: The Doctrine of Proportionality and 
Necessity” (1992) 86 Am Soc'y Int'l L Proc 58, at 59.  
30
 On this debate see Gray above n 24, pp 128-160. With regard to Article 51 being a 
„cornerstone‟ provision see Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v US), 2003 ICJ 
161,  separate opinion of Judge Simma, at 328 ¶ 6 („Everybody will be aware of the 
current crisis of the United Nations system of maintenance of peace and security, of 
which Articles 2(4) and 51 are cornerstones.‟) 
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the accepted position is that of a fusion of both customary provisions and 
current Charter law.
31
   
In order for a state to invoke self-defence under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter, it must have suffered an „armed attack‟.32 The term „armed 
attack‟ is undefined in the Charter but has been interpreted by the 
International Court of Justice to mean a “grave use of force”.33 By way of 
summary, if a state has suffered an armed attack (a grave use of force) and 
complied with the two cardinal principles of necessity and proportionality 
then such action will be lawful under international law. 
 
Does a Right to Protect Nationals Exist? 
 
The right to protect nationals abroad has been invoked on a number of 
occasions in the latter part of the Twentieth Century.
34
 However it has not 
proved to be a common claim and in the main its invocation is confined to 
only a few states in that period.
35
 The supporting argument in favour of the 
protection of nationals abroad starts with the language of Article 51. 
Supporters of the existence of this right argue that the „armed attack‟ element 
required for self-defence does not specifically require an armed attack against 
a state‟s own territory: for them an attack against the nationals of that state 
would suffice.
36
  
The assessment of what constitutes an armed attack will take into account 
differing factors dependent upon the nature and the context of events. As with 
other forms of armed attack, in order for the threshold to be met the attack 
against nationals would have to be „grave‟.37 Whilst a numerical measure of 
deaths or injuries caused to nationals might have a simplistic appeal, such an 
approach has been considered arbitrary.
38
 However, Bowett considers that 
there may be circumstances where a threat of danger to the nationals of a state 
abroad could be “great enough, or wide enough in its application, for it to be 
                                                     
31
 Ibid. 
32
 D Greig “Self-defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 require?” 
(1991) 40 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 366.  
33
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, above n 23. This 
statement was also reemployed in the Oil Platforms decision. Case Concerning Oil 
Platforms (Iran v US), 2003 I C J 161, ¶ 51 (Nov 6). See also Green above n 26, pp 
112 – 129; Constantinou  above, n 26. 
34
  Gray above n 24, p 156.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Bowett above n 2, p 43; J A Green  above n 2, p 60; Eichensehr above n 2, p 469 
37
 Green  above n 2, p 60. 
38
 Bowett above n 2, p 43. 
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legitimately construed as an attack on the state itself.”39 Therefore the attack 
on a state‟s nationals is actually an attack on the state itself and therefore 
legitimatises its act of self-defence. It has additionally been suggested that the 
position of the national vis-à-vis his state is a factor to take into account when 
analysing the issue of whether the armed attack threshold has been met. 
Accordingly, if a national is employed by a government in an official 
capacity, such as an Embassy official, or a national is targeted because of their 
nationality and therefore „as proxies for their national government‟,40 perhaps 
such a threat to a state's nationals is more easily characterised as the threat of 
an armed attack on the state itself.
41
  
Detractors of this view object to such an argument on three grounds.
42
 
First, the language of Article 51 is not elastic enough to stretch to including 
the concept of an attack against nationals.
43
 Secondly, there is insufficient 
state practice to support this concept.
44
 Finally, as with the concept of 
„Humanitarian Intervention‟45, there is a palpable fear that the development of 
the doctrine of protecting one‟s nationals abroad would lead to abuse and be 
utilised for nefarious purposes.
46
 However, in defence of the doctrine, it may 
be said that a close textual interpretation of Article 51 reveals that there is no 
explicit or even implicit requirement that an armed attack must be against the 
territory of a state and not merely its nationals.
47
 This perhaps requires a 
certain „leap of faith‟, although any action taken in self-defence would of 
                                                     
39
 Bowett above n 24, p 93. 
40
 Eichensehr above n 2, p 469.  
41
 Ibid, p 469. 
42
 For example, see generally I Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).  
43
 Green above n 2, p 60; and see also M Iqbal and S Hassan „'Armed and Ready'‟ 
(2008) 158 New Law Journal at 1. 
44
 Ibid;  Ronzitti above n 5, p 12; Arend and  Beck above note 18 pp 106 – 110; and J 
Quigley “Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama," (1990) 15 Yale J Int'l L 
276 at 287. 
45
 See generally I Brownlie International Law and the Use of Force by States 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Arend and Beck above n 18;  Dinstein 
above n 24;  Gray above n 24. For more detailed discussion, see L Henkin “Kosovo 
and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention” (1999) 93 Am J Int'l L 824; J I Charney 
“Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo “ (1999) 93 Am J Int'l L 834; R 
A Falk “Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law" (1999) 93 Am J 
Int'l L 847. 
46
 Green  above n 2, p 60;  Brownlie  above n 42, p 301; Quigley above n 44, p 293.  
47
 Ibid. See also A Randelzhofer  "Article 51" in Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002);  
Dinstein  above n 24, p 175.   
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course have to satisfy both the necessity and proportionality requirements set 
out in both Charter and customary international law.
48
  
With regard to state practice, Green takes a relatively nuanced view.
49
 On 
occasions when states have objected to such a doctrine (Entebbe, Panama, 
Grenada and South Ossetia) their objection was not against the doctrine itself, 
but rather against the actual deployment of force. For example, objection to 
the US‟s incursion into both Grenada and Panama was based largely on the 
disproportionate amount of troops involved in order to secure the safety of the 
threatened nationals.
50
 Similarly, in both Grenada and Panama, concerns were 
raised that these interventions were merely a pretext for regime change.
51
 That 
aside, those criticisms (at least in Green‟s view) were not against the doctrine 
per se, but rather the way in which the US sought to invoke it.
52
  
Equally, those states which objected to the „Entebbe incident‟ in which 
Israel used force to liberate its nationals who were being held hostage in 
Uganda in 1976 were not necessarily against the doctrine per se.
53
 Rather, 
they believed that Israel had not suffered an armed attack in order to invoke 
Article 51, nor had it exhausted other forms of remedy such as negotiation 
which would satisfy the necessity requirement.
54
 Although Russia‟s forcible 
action against Georgia in 2008 would seem to be a clear abuse of the claim to 
protection of nationals abroad,
55
 again one could argue that this was on 
grounds of a disproportionate response rather than the non-existence of the 
right to protect its nationals. Green concedes that there is an understandable 
reason for rejecting the concept of such a doctrine on policy grounds in that it 
could lead to abuse.
56
 However, many actions in self-defence involving a use 
of force could potentially have an alternative strategic goal in mind which 
would not necessarily preclude such a right existing in the first place. The real 
difficulty in advocating the protection of nationals abroad doctrine is that it 
requires an initial „leap of faith‟. A state has to „see the light‟ and truly believe 
that an armed attack on its nationals is tantamount to an armed attack on it and 
                                                     
48
 Above n 31. 
49
 Green above n 2, p 61. 
50
 Ibid, pp 62 – 64.  
51
 Ibid. See also, generally, M J Levitin “Law of Force and the Force of Law: 
Grenada, the Falklands, and Humanitarian Intervention” (1986) 27 Harv Int'l L J 621; 
and V Nanda “The Validity of United States Inervention in Panama Under 
International Law” (1990) 84 Am J Int'l L 494. 
52
 Green above no 2, p 62. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 See generally A Nußberger “The War between Russia and Georgia – Consequences 
and Unresolved Questions” (2009) 1 Goettingen Journal of International Law 341. 
56
 Green  above n 2, p 63. 
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therefore falls within the purview of Article 51. Effectively, the test for 
determining the lawfulness of protection of nationals is a two-stage test. First, 
have the nationals suffered an armed attack or been threatened with one? 
Secondly, if the answer is „yes‟ to the first stage of the test, is the response by 
the state both necessary and proportionate?  Arguably, if a state can meet both 
stages of the test then its action may be deemed lawful.  
  
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE BRITISH ACTION 
 
In order for the British evacuation of its nationals from Libya without 
Libyan consent to be lawful, it is necessary to consider whether the nationals 
had suffered an armed attack as per Article 51 of the UN Charter and whether 
the British response satisfied both requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.
57
  
Was the requirement of an „armed attack‟ met? In respect of the British 
nationals in Libya no particularised threat of harm or danger materialised and 
certainly no actual attack on British nationals was reported. In addition to 
which, the nationals that were subject to the rescue were not reported to have 
been employed by the government in an official capacity. They were British 
nationals in Libya in their capacity as private individuals. This is to be 
contrasted with the particular threats and actual attacks suffered by the 
nationals of the United States in the U.S. Embassy siege and hostage taking in 
Iran.
58
 In respect of the US Embassy hostages, they were both U.S. citizens 
and employed by the US government as embassy staff. When attacked, they 
were attacked in the grounds of the US Embassy and were clearly being 
attacked as „an overt proxy for the US government‟59 therefore more readily 
falling within a broader characterisation of „armed attack‟. It has been noted 
elsewhere that the more problematic situation arises where nationals are 
„unaffiliated with their national state except by nationality and are seized or 
threatened while acting as individuals or on the behalf of their non-
government employers.  In such instances, it is less clear that an attack on an 
individual is intended to be a proxy attack on their national state.‟60 In respect 
of the British nationals in Libya, whatever the harm or danger that was faced, 
it nevertheless involved private individuals and was purely a consequence of 
the general breakdown of civil order within Libya; furthermore, it was not 
sufficiently „grave‟ or specific to being a British national to meet the required 
                                                     
57
 Bowett above n 24, p 96. 
58
 Eichensehr above n 2, p 469. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid. 
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threshold of constituting an „armed attack‟, even within Bowett‟s 
conception.
61
  
The next factor to consider is whether the British intervention satisfied the 
conditions of necessity and proportionality. To begin, did the threat posed to 
British nationals necessitate British Special Forces undertaking their action? 
The answer would seem to be no since there was no specific threat that had 
been posed to British nationals other than the general dangers associated with 
the breakdown of civil order and the descent into civil war. Furthemore, at the 
time of the operation there was still the possibility of evacuating British and 
other nationals from Libya without the need to use British Special Forces. 
Civilian airlines and other forms of transportation were still operating. 
Therefore there would seem to be limited evidence of the requisite necessity 
for such an action to fall within the bounds of self-defence. Admittedly, from 
the British government‟s perspective one presumes that there would have 
been consideration of the planned UK involvement in the NATO operations 
that were to ensue. From this perspective a sensible pragmatic response to 
such a plan would be to remove one‟s nationals prior to such involvement to 
eliminate the likelihood of one‟s nationals eventually becoming a bargaining 
chip and propaganda weapon for the Libyan regime. However, this in itself 
does not mean that the removal of British nationals was a „necessity‟ in terms 
of establishing the lawfulness of a purported self-defence action.  
Did the British action meet the requirements of proportionality? The 
requirement of proportionality in this context means that the action taken by 
Britain was merely confined to evacuating its nationals from Libya. On the 
face of it the British action did not go beyond that which was necessary to 
achieve the goal of ensuring the protection and safe evacuation of its 
nationals. Whilst British military personnel apparently did travel extensively 
throughout Libya to secure the safety of British nationals and provide for their 
evacuation, this was completed without any reported use of force. 
Furthermore, the British action did not apparently involve any ulterior 
motivation or intent, and it may be contrasted for example with the US 
interventions in Grenada and Panama and the Russian intervention in 
Georgia.
62
 The British action could perhaps, therefore, be considered as 
complying with the proportionality requirement . 
Overall, then, we would argue that the intervention by British forces was 
not in response to an armed attack and was not „necessary‟, albeit that it was 
apparently proportionate. Nonetheless, due to the restricted effect of the 
British Special Forces operation in Libya, ie its confinement to evacuation of 
British and other foreign nationals, the British action seems to have been 
tolerated as a practical response to dangerous events unfolding in Libya. This 
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tolerant approach stems in part from the fact that the operation gave rise to no 
objection from the international community at large and, in particular, the 
Libyan government. Furthermore, in its analysis and discussion of events the 
British government gave no reported consideration to the question of the 
lawfulness of its operation. In addition to which, in as much as the doctrine of 
protection of nationals abroad is an aspect of a state‟s inherent right to self-
defence, the intervention was not reported to the United Nations Security 
Council by Britain (such a report would be required for self-defence under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter). 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The British action in Libya in late February 2011, and other comparable 
instances of state practice, do not add anything to any purported shift in the 
legal paradigm concerning the protection of nationals abroad in as much as 
they are considered as uncontroversial and pragmatic responses to such 
extreme circumstances. Today, governments are generally expected to provide 
more extensive protection and assistance to their nationals when they are 
exposed to danger/threat of even a very general and non-specific kind – ie not 
a specific threat to nationals of a particular state as for example in Iran (v US 
citizens) or Entebbe (v Israeli). However, in so far as a state merely effects an 
evacuation short of armed intervention – such actions seem to be „tolerated‟ 
without having legal „effect‟. Therefore such action does not constitute state 
practice for the purpose of a developing right under customary international 
law. Action such as the UK‟s is tolerated due to the precise and limited 
objective of extraction, but the toleration does not equate to the necessary 
intention by the majority of states that the doctrine develop as a customary 
right. From a practical perspective one suggestion as to why states tolerate 
rescue missions on their territory is that such actions help to diffuse 
potentially difficult situations. There is perhaps a fear that if foreign nationals 
remain on their territory, the „parent‟ state may become more involved in their 
domestic affairs than would be desirable: tolerating instances of evacuation 
amounts to the lesser of two evils. 
 
 
